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1. 'A House for the Future', published in
January 2000 by the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of
Lords, chaired by Lord Wakeham.
Chapter 2 - Development of the House of Lords
2.17 Several features of the present House of Lords, which have contributed to
the relative success it has made of its' new role, were highlighted with
approval by our respondents to our consultation exercise
. independence - Members of the House of Lords have considerable
independence; they are relatively immune from any pressure from the Government
or the political parties. Most members have a degree of personal standing,
which makes it unlikely that they will subordinate their personal judgement to
the views of their party. Few have further political ambitions. They also have
security of tenure. Also, the presence of the Crossbenchers, comprising at
least 20 per cent of the membership of the House of Lords, is important in
ensuring that independent judgement is brought to bear on the issues; and
. non-partisan style - The presence of the Crossbenchers also means that
a partisan appeal will rarely strike a chord in the House of Lords. Reasoned
and courteous argument is more likely to secure support, as well as being
consistent with the self-regulating nature of the chamber. The contrast with
the more combative style
of the House of Commons is noticeable. (page 23)
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Chapter
4 - Making the Law
4.40 The composition and characteristics of the Lords.
The blend of experience and expertise found among members of the House of Lords
means that on any given issue there are usually a number of peers with relevant
practical experience and knowledge or with long experience of grappling with
the same policy issues. Such members usually have extensive contacts with the
relevant interest groups. They can present their case forcefully and well. In
the absence of strong party discipline and with a reasonable proportion of
Crossbenchers, Ministers need to win the argument to be sure of winning the
vote. In any event, the issues certainly get a thorough airing. A further
factor is that the members of the House of Lords are equipped and prepared to
take on the relatively unglamorous task of scrutinising the detailed wording of
Bills and raising relatively minor, non-political and technical points. (page
44)
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Chapter
8 - Holding the Government to Account
General debate and specialist investigation
8.27 One of the most important roles of the House of Lords is that it provides
a forum for the general debate of major public issues "in an atmosphere less
pressurised than the House of Commons by party political issues". Several
submissions noted that the quality of debate in the House of Lords is often
high and that the able and distinguished members from diverse backgrounds who
contribute to this work play a significant role in maintaining the
effectiveness of the chamber's role in holding Government to account. Others
commented that the less 'party political' nature of the present House of Lords
produces an environment which encourages rational analysis and objectivity. A
vital factor in this approach to debate is the presence of the Crossbenchers,
since the political parties need to gain their support to win a vote. There was
unanimous support among those submitting evidence for the reformed second
chamber to continue to provide a distinctive forum for national debate. (page
87)
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Chapter
10 - Characteristics of the Reformed Second Chamber
10.26 We see advantages in preserving a strong independent element such as that
represented in the present House of Lords by the Crossbenchers - members who
are not affiliated to any political party. The existence of such an independent
element would of course be consistent with our desire to see a second chamber
which was more broadly representative of British society. People in all walks
of life have political views, but the net should be cast sufficiently wide to
ensure that a proportion of those selected to be members of the second chamber
are not formally affiliated to any particular party and will sit on the Cross
Benches. If the proportion of Crossbenchers were large enough, it would provide
an absolute guarantee that no one political party could ever come to control
the second chamber. The fact that the Crossbenchers might hold the 'balance of
power' would encourage the parties' spokespersons to seek to win any arguments
on their merits rather than by appealing to party loyalty or partisan
interests. The authority of the second chamber would be reinforced if decisions
were taken at least to some extent on the basis of an independent judgement of
the merits of each case.
10.27 It would be wrong, however, to place the onus for ensuring
independent-mindedness solely on Crossbenchers. During the consultation
exercise our attention was repeatedly drawn - with approval - to examples of
members of the House of Lords who were affiliated to a party but had not voted
invariably in accordance with their party whip. We share the view that even
those members of the second chamber who are affiliated to a party should be
prepared to deal with issues on their merits and should exercise a certain
independence of judgement. (page 102)
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Chapter
11 - Principles of Composition
11.30 Above all, an appointments system independent of any political control
would limit the influence of the political parties on the second chamber and
provide the only sure way of securing a reasonable proportion of independent
members to sit on the Cross Benches. (page 111)
11.33 In the White Paper Modernising Parliament. Reforming the House of Lords,
the Government has set out its proposals for the handling of appointments to
the interim House of Lords. These involve the establishment of an independent
but non-statutory Appointments Commission which will be responsible for
identifying suitable Crossbench nominees andfor vetting all party nominations
(taking over the role of the Political Honours Scrutiny Committee).The Prime
Minister will continue to be responsible for determining the numbers of
nominations which each political party can make but he has committed himself to
aiming for no more than parity of numbers as between Labour and the main
Opposition party. He has also made clear that, save in wholly exceptional
circumstances, he will not seek to exercise any influence over any nominations
other than those from his own party. As to Cross Bench nominations, the White
Paper says that the Appointments Commission "will operate an open and
transparent nomination system for Cross Bench peers, both actively inviting
public nominations and encouraging suitable bodies to make nominations.The
general qualities being sought and the type of information required to support
a nomination will be made public. It will seek to cast its net wider than the
present system to achieve successful nominations". These interim arrangements
will clearly be an improvement over the previous arrangements for appointing
life peers, but in our view they would be unsatisfactory as a long-term basis
for securing appointments to the second chamber. (page 112)
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Cross Benchers
11.34 As we have noted before, there is widespread support for the preservation
of a strong cadre of independent members in the second chamber. Chapter 10
explains why we agree that this is essential. In the present House of Lords the
proportion of Crossbenchers (excluding the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary) is just
under 20 per cent of the total membership. While in the past the attendance
rate of Crossbenchers has been lower than that of party-affiliated members,
Crossbenchers have regularly provided at least 10 per cent of the members
present on a typical day. It is too early to say what pattern will develop in
the interim House of Lords, but in our view at least 20 per cent of the members
of the reformed second chamber should not be affiliated to any of the main
political parties. This would be a large enough proportion to ensure that no
single party could achieve a working majority in the second chamber. It would
also be sufficient to encourage the political parties to present their cases in
a relatively dispassionate way, designed to attract the Crossbenchers' support.
(page 112)
11.38 In favouring an independent appointments system, we are building on the
direction set by the Government in establishing an independent Appointments
Commission to be responsible for appointments to the interim House of Lords.
However, we consider that leaving the Prime Minister with the power to
determine the political balance in the second chamber by deciding the number of
nominations each party should make would be inconsistent with the need to
establish the reformed second chamber's independence and its freedom from undue
political influence. We also see no reason why an Appointments Commission
should be limited to the task of identifying suitable Crossbench members of the
second chamber. In our view, an Appointments Commission should have a far wider
remit. It should be geared towards constructing a second chamber which would be
broadly representative of British society as a whole and should be empowered to
appoint members who happen to be affiliated to a political party but who have
characteristics which justify their appointment on wider grounds. (page 114)
11.41 The overall result should be a second chamber that is more democratic and
more representative than the present House of Lords. It will be more democratic
because the membership as a whole (excluding the Crossbenchers) will reflect
the balance of political opinion within the country as expressed at the most
recent general election and because the 'regional' members will be
proportionally representative of political opinion within their respective
regions. It will be more representative, because it will contain members from
all parts of the country and from all walks of life, broadly equal numbers of
men and women and representatives of all the country's main ethnic and
religious communities. (page 115)
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